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3Abstract
It is generally recognized that countries wanting to join a monetary union should display
the optimal currency area properties. One such property is the similarity of business
cycles. We therefore undertook to analyze the synchronization of business cycles
between the EMU and eight new EU members from Central and Eastern European
countries (CEECs), for which the next step to be considered in the integration process is
entry into the EMU. In contrast to the usually analyzed GDP and industrial production
data, we extend our analysis to the major expenditure and sectoral components of GDP
and use several measures of synchronization. The main findings of the paper are that
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia have achieved a high degree of synchronization with the
EMU for GDP, industrial production and exports, but not for consumption and services.
The other CEECs have achieved less or no synchronization. There has been a significant
increase in the synchronization of GDP and also its major components in the EMU
members since the start of the run-up to EMU. While this lends support for the
existence of OCA endogeneity, it can not be unambiguously attributed to it because
there is also evidence of a world business cycle. Another finding is that the
consumption-correlation puzzle remains, but its magnitude has greatly diminished in the
EMU members, which is good news for common monetary policy.
JEL Classification numbers: E32, F41
Keywords: business cycle synchronization, consumption-correlation puzzle, EMU, new
EU members, OCA endogeneity
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71. Introduction
In the ten new EU members — eight of which are former socialist countries from
Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) — attention is increasingly focused on the next
step of the European integration process: entry into the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU). The benefits and costs of a currency union have been extensively analyzed in
the literature, prompted in part by the discussions leading up to the creation of EMU
and, more recently, by the discussion about the future enlargement of the eurozone1.
The theoretical foundations of currency unions have been developed in the literature on
optimum currency areas (OCA) pioneered by Mundell (1961) to which McKinnon
(1963), Kenen (1969), Tavlas (1993), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) and many other
authors have subsequently contributed2. The OCA theory postulates that the benefits of
a currency union depend on whether the countries contemplating to form a monetary
union share certain common characteristics, called the OCA properties. Among these
properties, the similarity of business cycles features prominently, because if cycles are
synchronized, the cost of foregoing the possibility of using counter-cyclical monetary
policy is minimized. Therefore, when considering the appropriate timing of entry into
the eurozone, satisfying the Maastricht criteria of nominal convergence of inflation,
long term interest rates, fiscal deficit, public debt and exchange rate stability within
ERM II is only one set of factors to be taken into account. The question also has to be
asked whether the business cycles are sufficiently synchronized so that the new
members can comfortably give up monetary and exchange rate policy independence.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess the current degree of business
cycle synchronization in CEECs vis-à-vis the euro zone cycle and to see how it
compares to the current and earlier levels of synchronization in the euro area countries;
and (2) to analyze the evolution over time of the business cycle synchronization in the
euro zone countries and to see, in particular, whether it has increased since 1993-97, the
run-up period to the EMU. This latter question is relevant because it has been argued in
the literature that participation in a currency union may itself lead to greater
synchronization of business cycles. This is referred to in the literature as the
endogeneity of the OCA properties. Using a panel of thirty years of data for twenty
industrial countries, Frankel and Rose (1998) find a strong positive relationship between
trade integration and business cycle correlation. Therefore, to the extent that
participation in a currency union increases trade integration, membership in a currency
union will lead to more highly correlated business cycles.  Rose (2000) finds that
currency unions increase trade substantially and hence concludes that a country is more
                                                
1 See, in particular, Eichengreen (1992), Emerson et al. (1992), De Grauwe (2002) and HM Treasury
(2003). Csajbók and Csermely (2002) analyses the costs and benefits of the introduction of the euro in
Hungary. See also Szapáry (2002).
2 See Mongelli (2002) for a comprehensive review of the OCA literature.
8likely to satisfy the criteria for entry into a currency union ex post than ex ante.
Krugman’s (1993) “lessons from Massachusetts” warns however that trade integration
might lead to specialization and therefore increase the likelihood of asymmetric shocks.
Since Rose (2000), many others have investigated the impact of common
currencies on trade, for instance, Persson (2001), Glick and Rose (2001) Rose and
Wincoop (2001), Frankel and Rose (2002), Bun and Klaassen (2002), Kenen (2002),
and Micco, Stein and Ordoñez (2003). All these studies demonstrate a positive effect of
common currencies on trade, although the effect found is smaller then the initial
findings of Rose (2000).3 Another argument supporting the endogeneity of the OCA
criteria as it may apply to the EMU is that the common monetary policy, supported by
the discipline of the Stability and Growth Pact, eliminates or at least diminishes the
asymmetricity of policy responses. If policies are the source of shocks, EMU
membership reduces the risk of asymmetricity of shocks.
Our research contributes to the business cycle comovement literature in the
following ways. First, we look at a large number of countries: eight CEECs, ten euro
zone countries and a control group consisting of the three EMU-outs and five other
countries to check for the endogeneity of the OCA properties in the EMU. For the
CEECs, we look at the last ten years, while for most of the other countries the last
twenty years. We also include Russia in our investigation to document the shifts in
comovements vis-à-vis this previously important trading partner of the CEECs. Second,
there are some papers analyzing a broader or narrower group of CEECs with respect to
synchronization, but these papers analyze GDP or industrial production only.4 We also
analyze the major expenditure and sectoral components of GDP. From the perspective
of OCA and common monetary policy, it is relevant to know to what extent are
synchronized those components of GDP which drive aggregate demand and therefore
influence inflation. The analysis of the comovement of GDP components also sheds
some further light on the so-called “consumption-correlation puzzle” which is one of the
six major puzzles in international macroeconomics according to Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2000). Third, in order to make our findings robust, we use five measurements of
synchronization, two filtering techniques and two measures of euro area activity. Most
previous empirical research on CEECs has looked at only cycle correlation with respect
to Germany as a measure of comovement. We also analyze leads/lags, volatility and
persistence of the cycle and a measure of impulse-response. Smaller leads/lags, less
volatility, similar persistence, and equal impulse-response make the common monetary
policy more suited for a country participating in a currency union. We made all our
calculations with the two most popular filtering techniques in the business cycle
literature: the Hodrick-Prescott and the Band-Pass filters. Both techniques have
deficiencies, but if both reveal a similar trend, the finding can be regarded as more
                                                
3 For an overview of the findings of empirical research on the topic see Rose (2002).
4 Frenkel, Nickel and Schmidt (1999), Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001), Boreiko (2002), Frenkel and
Nickel (2002), Babetski, Boone and Maurel (2002), Korhonen (2003), Fidrmuc (2004). The exceptions
are Boone and Maurel (1998 and 1999) who also study the unemployment rate.
9robust. Finally, as we are more interested in synchronization vis-à-vis the euro area as a
whole rather than just Germany, we look at the euro area activity against which we
measure the synchronization of individual countries. For this purpose, we use an
aggregate from the ECB area-wide model database and a common factor calculated by
us, because the former is more burdened with measurement errors in the pre-1999
period.
It is necessary to say at the outset what are the questions that this paper does not
investigate empirically. It does not examine the sources of shocks, i.e., whether the
business fluctuations are caused by supply or demand shocks. Many authors have found
that both demand and supply shocks contribute to fluctuations, the former dominating in
the shorter frequencies and the latter becoming important in the longer run5. Identifying
the sources of shocks is important because monetary policy can not deal with all types
of shocks similarly. However, if business cycles are synchronized, it means that most
likely the countries are not subject to significant asymmetric shocks. Another question
our paper does not investigate empirically is what are the channels of transmission of
business cycles from one country to another. The empirical evidence discussed in the
literature shows that openness, trade integration and similarity of economic structures
have a strong effect on international comovements. Investigating the sources of shocks
and the transmission mechanism of business cycles remain challenging areas of research
that exceeds the scope of this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the
methodologies and Section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 presents and discusses
the findings. Section 5 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
2. Methodology
Perhaps the most popular method in the synchronization literature of CEECs is the
bivariate Blanchard–Quah-type SVAR decomposition of supply and demand shocks
based on output and inflation data.6 Once supply and demand shocks are identified
separately for individual CEECs and Germany or the euro area, synchronization is
assessed by the correlation between the shocks at home and in Germany/the euro area.
However, the use of SVARs is debated even for countries having much longer sample
periods7. Imposing long-run identifying restriction for six to ten years of data available
for the CEECs would not make much sense in the framework of the SVAR model.
                                                
5 See, for instance, Blanchard and Quah (1989), Karras (1994) and Bergman (1996). According to the
well-known real business cycle (RBC) model, business fluctuations are caused by exogenous technology
shocks.  However, the RBC model has been criticized, particularly by Summers (1986) and Mankiw
(1989) who argue that changes in total factor productivity can be explained by aggregate demand
impulses rather than exogenous productivity shocks. Evans (1992) also argues that the RBC literature has
overstated the role of exogenous productivity shocks. There are good reviews of the business cycle
literature in Kydland and Prescott (1990), King and Rebelo (1999) and Fiorito and Kollintzas (1994).
6See Babetski, Boone and Maurel (2002), Frenkel and Nickel (2002), Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001),
Frenkel et al. (1999), and Csajbók and Csermely eds. (2002).
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There is also an important problem with the inflation rates of CEECs used by the
studies, as price developments were heavily affected in the 1990s by price and trade
liberalization and administrative price adjustments which led to large changes in relative
prices. Moreover, some of the inflation data series are not stationary and seem to be
even an I(2) process (implying an I(3) process for the price level) which raises a
problem that is quite difficult to handle.
Due to these theoretical and practical deficiencies of the SVAR technique, we
use detrended time series as cyclical measures — which are standard in the
synchronization literature — and calculate various synchronization measures based on
them. In the following, we describe the methodological issues related to detrending, the
measurement of the euro area economic activity, and the measurement of
synchronization.
2.1. Detrending
The first issue we face is detrending. There are various detrending methods adopted in
the literature and empirical results might depend on the specific filter adopted, as it is
demonstrated in Canova (1998). Canova compared the properties of the cyclical
components of seasonally adjusted US data as revealed by various filters and concluded
that, both quantitatively and qualitatively, properties of business cycles vary across
detrending methods and that alternative detrending methods extract different types of
information from the data.
This result posts a warning sign for empirical business cycle research. In order to
make our results more robust, we use and compare the results of the two most widely
adopted filters in the literature, namely the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP) and the Band-
Pass filter (BP). Among these two, the BP filter is preferable from a theoretical point of
view, as argued for instance by Stock and Watson (1999), since it intends to eliminate
both high frequency fluctuations (which might be due to measurement errors and noise)
and low frequency fluctuations (which rather reflect the long term growth component)8.
However, the BP filter also has weaknesses, since in finite samples only various
                                                                                                                                              
7 See, for instance, Faust and Leeper (1997) and Cooley and Dwyer (1998).
8 Several criticisms of the HP filter have been raised in the literature. Some of the criticisms simply
originate from the arbitrary choice of the smoothness parameter. In addition, Cogley and Nason (1995)
shows that when applied to stationary time series (including trend-eliminated trend-stationary series), the
HP filter works as a high-pass filter, that is, suppresses cycles with higher frequencies while letting low
frequency cycles go through without change. However, for different stationary series, the HP filter is not
a high-pass filter, but suppresses high and low frequency cycles and amplifies business cycle frequencies,
therefore creating artificial business cycles. Similar criticism was voiced by Harvey and Jaeger (1993).
They showed that the HP filter creates spurious cycles in detrended random walks and I(2) processes, and
that the danger of finding large sample cross-correlations between independent but spurious HP cycles is
not negligible. Another important weakness of the HP filter is the treatment of sudden structural breaks,
as the HP filter smooths out its effect to previous and subsequent periods. Moreover, the HP filter works
as a symmetric two-sided filter in the middle of the sample, but becomes unstable at the end and at the
beginning of the sample, although end-point instability is also a weakness of BP filter. For both filters, it
is recommended that three years at both ends of the sample of the filtered series be disregarded.
11
approximations could be used.9 In particularly, since we have only ten years of data for
the CEECs, the application of the BP filter, i.e., filtering out cycles with less than eight
years periodicity, the standard upper band adopted in the literature, might be
questionable. Therefore, analyzing the results based on the two filters increases the
robustness of our results, even if both of them have deficiencies. The adoption of these
two filters also allows better comparison of our results to previous empirical research
reported in the literature. 10
2.2. Measuring the euro area economic activity
We use two measures of euro area economic activity: (1) a euro area aggregate from the
ECB area-wide model database and (2) a common factor calculated by us. For the area-
wide model of the ECB, euro area aggregates have been calculated for various series
back until 197011. However, these series must include various measurement errors,
because quarterly national accounts are not available for all countries for earlier years,
and because aggregation is affected by exchange rate fluctuations when there were
separate currencies before 1999. Therefore, we also calculated a dynamic factor model
for the detrended data of five core countries of the EMU in order to identify a common
factor vis-à-vis which we can measure synchronization. The countries used for this
calculation are France, Germany and Italy, as these countries are the three largest in the
EMU. Austria and the Netherlands are also included as they had fixed exchange rates to
the Deutsche mark for a long period of time and were highly integrated with the
German economy. In principle, we could have calculated the common factor of all
EMU members and use that as the measure of the euro area economic activity.
However, individual quarterly time series of all countries are not available for the full
sample period, so we had to select. The countries selected are those identified also by
Artis and Zhang (1998) as the “core” EMU countries on the basis of several variables
chosen to reflect OCA considerations, except that we include Italy and exclude
Belgium.
Dynamic factor models have recently gained renewed interest in the business
cycle literature12. In these models, there are unobservable measures of economic
activity. These unobserved measures are either common factor(s) (for all or some
groups of the countries/series analyzed) or idiosyncratic factors. For example, analyzing
                                                
9 For the BP filter we adopt the approximation suggested by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003), which is
the latest among the three mostly commonly adopted approximations in the literature.
10 As a preliminary check, we also used seasonal differencing, that is, the data in the format that most
statistical offices of CEECs publish: real growth rates compared to the same quarter of previous year. The
results, even for the GDP components, were qualitatively the same as the results obtained with the HP and
BP filtered seasonally adjusted time series.
11 For a description and further reference for the euro area aggregate national accounts see
http://www.ecb.int/stats/stats.htm and Fagan et al (2001). The aggregate that we use has constant country
composition and handles the issue of German unification so that there is no level shift in the series.
12 See, for example, Gregory et al. (1997), Stock and Watson (1998), Forni and Reichlin (1998), Gregory
and Head (1999), Forni et al. (2000), Kose et al. (2003), Monfort et al. (2003), Helbling and Bayoumi
(2003) and Giannone et al. (2003).
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a single indicator like GDP, the following model might describe the transmission of the
euro area business cycles among k countries:
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where tiy ,  is the detrended
13 GDP of country i, EUtz is the (unobservable) index of
European activity, i.e. the common factor, and tiz ,  is the (unobservable) index of
country specific economic activity not explained by the common factor. Hence, this
formulation allows the adoption of the standard assumption behind empirical state-space
models of no contemporaneous or lagged correlation among the error terms of the
equations. The -s and -s are parameters to be estimated along with the standard errors
of the innovations. Note that there are k+1 state equations and k observation equations
leading to a large number of estimated parameters even in the case of independent
errors.
Before estimation, we standardized the cyclical components of individual
countries, which is a standard procedure in the literature. The reason for that is to have
equal variances across countries in order to have the possibility of an equal role in the
common factor. As smaller countries tend to have more volatile cycles than large
countries14, small countries would receive higher weights without the transformation.
Standardization ensures that all series are treated symmetrically, which does not imply
that the common factor will explain equal portions of the variance of the standardized
individual series. Since the common factor is estimated from standardized series, it will
be no point to talk about the variance of the common factor, so that when we turn to the
volatility of the cycles, only the results for the euro area aggregate will be analyzed.
There are various ways to estimate dynamic factor models. We chose the maximum
likelihood (ML) estimation and Kalman-filtering of the state-space representation. Our
choice stems from the small number of cross section units (five) which makes it
virtually impossible to adopt other methods (e.g., the dynamic principal component
analysis) requiring large cross sections. Our small cross-section leads to a reasonably
small number of parameters to be estimated, hence the computation difficulties
indicated by, for instance, Gregory et al. (1997) does not arise in our case. Indeed, our
estimation converged to a unique maximum for various starting values.
2.3. Measures of synchronization
We use five measures to assess synchronization. Since we are interested in the analysis
of temporal change in the synchronization of business cycles, we calculated our
                                                
13 We calculate the common factor for both HP and BP filtered series.
14 See, for instance, Gerlach (1988) and Head (1995).
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measures for various sub-periods. Note, however, that detrending and calculation of the
common factor was performed for the longest available sample of each series.
(a) Correlation. Contemporaneous unconditional correlation between the business cycle
of the euro area and that of individual countries in different time periods. We use non-
overlapping five-year long periods to study the changing pattern of correlations. We
also calculated five-year rolling sample correlations, which led to similar results. We
have therefore chosen the simpler way for expositional reasons.
(b) Leads or lags. We calculated the lead/lag for which the unconditional correlation is
the largest. The interpretation of the results for this measure is the following: a value of
zero indicates that contemporaneous correlation is the highest, negative values indicate
that the euro area leads the country studied, while a positive number indicates the
reverse. We have checked the values for up to 3 in order not to decrease the degrees of
freedom too much, so the value of 3 indicates that the lead/lag is 3 or larger. From the
perspective of optimum currency area, zero or small lead/lag would be optimal.
(c) Volatility of the cycles. We defined volatility as the squared deviation from the mean
of the cycle, i.e., from zero. In order to evaluate the results more easily, we have
normalized the values relative to the euro area.
(d) Persistence. The dynamic effect of any shocks depends on the persistence of the
series: for highly persistent series, the shock has a long-lasting effect, while for weakly
persistent series the effect of the shock diminishes sooner. Consequently, from the
perspective of synchronization, similar persistence is rather important. The measure we
use is the first order autocorrelation coefficient of the cycle. Persistence defined this
way reflects a mixture of the effects of various shocks and the effects of transmission
mechanism through which these shocks pass on to the economies. Some shocks could
have longer-term effects while others might diminish sooner, and some economies
could react to a given shock differently than the other. Therefore, this simple measure
does not allow the identification of the relative importance of various shocks and the
way the economies react to them; rather this measure reflects the aggregate effect of the
similarities of shocks and their transmission. We do not formulate any normative
statement on whether a "high" or a "low"' persistence is better, we are simply interested
in whether persistence is similar across countries. As it is documented in the literature,
the estimation of autocorrelation coefficients is downward biased in the case of large
outliers and it is also documented that for noisy series the autocorrelation coefficient
tends to be smaller. Therefore, our measure also gives an indication of the possible
presence of outliers and noise in the series which, again, should be small when there are
no country specific shocks.
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(e) Impulse-response. The accumulated effect (up to six quarters) of a euro area shock
(proxied as a shock to the common factor) on the individual countries. When correlation
is contemporaneous and large and the volatility and the persistence of the cycle is the
same as in the euro area, then this measure will not deliver results different from the
previous ones. However, whenever any of the above conditions are not satisfied, then it
can give an additional indicator of synchronization by showing a measure of the
magnitude of the impact of a euro area shock. Moreover, by calculating the impact from
a VAR, which by definition includes own lags as well, this indicator can assess whether
the results from the previous unconditional correlation coefficient are blurred by
persistence. To some extent, this can be regarded as a summary measure of the previous
four measures of synchronization. The six-quarter period for adding up the responses
was selected to measure the cumulative impact for a period which is usually regarded as
the one during which monetary policy takes its effect.
The impulse-responses were calculated from three-variable VARs including the
common factor, the euro area aggregate, and the individual country studied. We
calculated our measure based on the “generalized impulse-response function” of
Pesaran and Shin (1998), which is independent of the ordering of the variables.  The lag
lengths of the VARs were selected with Sims’s likelihood-ratio test for each country,
with six lags being the largest possible value. We calculated the accumulated impulse-
response up to six quarters and normalized it with the effect of the common factor on
the euro area itself. Therefore, the value of one indicates perfect synchronization
according to this measure. Due to the large number of parameters to be estimated, we
estimated the models for the most recent ten-year long period of 1993-2002, hence we
cannot study the temporal change in the impact.15 We look at the impulse-response only
for GDP, not its components.
3. Data
We include in our study the eight CEECs (Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia), ten members of the EMU (Austria,
Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal)16, and
various other countries as a control group. The latter includes the EMU-outs (Denmark,
Sweden and the United Kingdom), the other European countries (Switzerland and
Norway), the United States and Japan to represent the other two main economic areas,
and also Russia to represent the country which was formerly the most important trading
partner of CEECs. The role of the control group is to assess whether there is evidence of
                                                
15 Note that quarterly GDP data of Ireland is available only since 1997, so its sample period is shorter than
in the case of all other countries. Due to the shorter sample, we have set the largest possible order of the
VAR to three.
16 Greece and Luxembourg are not included in the OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts database which
is our main source of statistics. The only Greek time series available at a quarterly frequency is gross
industrial production, which we will compare to value added of industry available for other countries.
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the endogeneity of the OCA properties in the EMU and whether there is evidence of a
“world business cycle”.
Our analysis covers GDP and its major expenditure and sectoral components:
private consumption, investments, exports, imports, industrial production, and services.
We do not include government consumption as it is a policy-driven aggregate, the
analysis of which falls outside of the scope of this paper. Furthermore, we do not study
agricultural production and construction which have a small share in GDP and are
subject to country specific shocks, such as seasonal factors (agriculture) or policies (for
instance, housing subsidies or the availability of mortgage loans).
Our sample includes quarterly data between 1983-2002 grouped in four non-
overlapping five-year periods: 1983-87; 1988-92; 1993-97 and 1998-2002.17 Most of
our data are from the OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts database. The other sources
and a full description of data availability is detailed in the Data Appendix.
Unfortunately, not all time series are available for the full period. Most notably, CEECs’
times series start only in 199318, but data for expenditure and sectoral components of
GDP are not available for all CEECs, and some of the available data starts later than
1993. For the euro area aggregate, the sectoral breakdown of GDP is available only
since 1991, hence industrial production and services are studied only for the period
since 1991.
4. Results
Since we examine a relatively large number of countries (26) and use two measures of
euro area economic activity, two filters and five measures of synchronization, and since
we look at several measures of economic activity (GDP and its components) during
consecutive five-year long periods, it would be cumbersome to show all the results.
Therefore, we first analyze the comovement in GDP cycles in detail and continue with a
less detailed description of the results for the rest of the aggregates, underlying the
similarities and differences with the findings for GDP. Moreover, we present only the
point estimate of various statistics but not their confidence bands for three reasons.
First, for the large number of statistics we calculate, reporting their confidence bands
would overburden the presentation and interpretation of results. Second, as we use
filtered series which are themselves burdened with measurement errors, the confidence
bands, calculated by standard ways, could reflect only the uncertainty related to
estimation, but not the uncertainty inherent in the filtered series. Third, the various sub-
                                                
17 Whenever data was available, detrending was performed for the 1980-2002 period in order to alleviate
the instability property of both filters at the beginning of the sample period.
18 Although for a few CEECs GDP is available for some years before 1993, we did not include them in
the analysis in order to exclude most part of the transitional recession of the early nineties. In contrast to
the US and most European data series, national accounts data series in CEECs are not seasonally
adjusted. Therefore, we seasonally adjusted the times series using the Census X11 method.
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samples we use allow the analysis of stability in the statistics, which is an indirect
indication of the uncertainty of the estimates.
4.1. Gross Domestic Product
GDP is the most inclusive measure of economic activity and is therefore a useful proxy
for overall business cycle, even though technically business cycles are defined as
comovements of many aggregates. A large amount of empirical work in the business
cycle and synchronization literature have used the GDP data. For a quick visual test,
Figures 1/a-b-c show the cycles calculated with the HP (left column) and BP (right
column) filters for the three country groups: CEECs, EMU and control group. We plot
Russia in the Figure showing the cycles of the CEECs. The cycle of the euro area
aggregate appears in all figures as the reference value. In general, the visual impression
indicates a rather strong comovement with the euro area for most EMU members,
somewhat less for the control group countries, although Switzerland stands out as a
country well synchronized, and an even smaller or no comovement for the CEECs, with
the notable exception of Hungary, Poland and Slovenia which exhibit significant
synchronization in the most recent period. As for the main economic areas, the US
seems to lead and Japan to lag the European cycle. We quantify these visual
impressions one by one below.
4.1.1. Cycle correlation
Figures 2/a-b look at the evolution over time of correlation: Figure 2/a shows the
contemporaneous correlation coefficients between the cycle of the euro area aggregate
and the individual countries’ cycles, while Figure 2/b shows the correlations using the
common factor. The left column of panels shows the correlations based on the HP filter
and the right column those based on the BP filter. The three rows of panels show results
for the CEECs, the EMU members and the control group countries.
Among the CEECs, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia show strong improvement in
cyclical correlation from the 1993-97 period to the 1998-2002 period. However, the
other five CEECs show almost no tendency to move toward greater synchronization
during this period.  It is useful to look at the shifts in correlations of the CEECs vis-à-vis
Russia, formerly their most important trading partner. Figure 3 crossplots the correlation
with both the euro area and Russia in 1993-97 and in 1998-02. In 1993-97, the three
Baltic states correlated quite strongly with Russia, with coefficients ranging between
0.4-0.7, but the other CEECs did not exhibit any correlation in this period. By 1998-
2002, correlation of the Baltic states with Russia declined substantially, while the
correlation of the other CEECs increased, though it remained weak, except for the
Czech Republic.
The strong correlation between the business cycles of the Baltic States and
Russia in the earlier period is not surprising given that these states were part of the
Soviet Union. Following the independence of the Baltic countries, their integration into
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the Russian economy came loose and their trade shifted increasingly toward Western
countries. The lack of correlation of the other CEECs with Russia in the period 1993-97
is a result of both the collapse of trade with the Soviet Union and the rapid restructuring
of trade of the CEECs toward the EU. The correlation of the Czech Republic seems to
be a coincidence induced by the effects of independent currency crises — in the Czech
Republic in 1997 and in Russia in 1998 — which led to a decline in GDP in both
countries. It is noteworthy that the business cycle of Russia itself became more
correlated with the EMU cycle between the two periods under consideration, an
indication that Russia also is increasingly integrated into the world economy.
The EMU member countries have become more synchronized over time
according to all the correlation measures calculated. The movement toward greater
synchronization is particularly evident since 1993, the start of the run-up to the
European Monetary Union.
Figure 4 shows in a more telling way the level of correlation for all countries for
the most recent five-year period of 1998-2002 between the cycles of the euro area
aggregate and individual countries (panel a) and between the cycles of the common
factor and individual countries (panels b). There are two columns for each countries
showing the correlation based on the HP-filter (left column) and BP-filter (right
column). The countries are arranged in decreasing order of correlation based on the HP-
filtered series.
The three leading CEECs mentioned above (Hungary, Poland and Slovenia)
clearly stand out: the values of their correlation coefficients are comparable to that of
several current EMU member states. On the other hand, the other five CEECs show zero
comovement or even counter-movement. Among current EMU-members, Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands are the most synchronized, while
Portugal, Finland, and Ireland show the least correlation. Interestingly, some of the
control group countries are more synchronized than these three smaller EMU-members.
The most notable example is Switzerland, which shows as high a correlation as the most
synchronized EMU members. The UK and Sweden also reveal stronger synchronization
than the above mentioned three EMU-members.
4.1.2. Leads and lags in the cycles
Tables 1/a-b show the values of the leads/lags in the business cycles for the highest
correlation value between the euro area and the individual countries examined.19 The
three leading CEECs perform the best in this respect as well, having zero or close to
zero phase shift in the most recent period. The other CEECs show a diverse picture with
greater leads/lags. The tendency of almost all Western European countries to move
toward contemporaneous correlation is further evidence of a strong business cycle
                                                
19 As said earlier, we have checked the values up to 3, so the value of 3 indicates that the lead or lag is 3
or larger.
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synchronization in Europe. It is noteworthy that the US led the European cycle in the
past 15 years while Japan lagged the European cycle in the past decade.
4.1.3. Volatility of the business cycles
Table 2 shows the volatilities of the individual countries’ business cycles vis-à-vis the
EMU aggregate business cycle. Two main observations can be made from an
examination of the data. First, as reported also by Gerlach (1988) and Head (1995),
smaller countries exhibit larger fluctuations. Gerlach speculates that possible
explanations for this phenomenon are that larger countries may be more diversified, and
small, more open economies may be subject to more foreign disturbances. The latter
argument is not supported by the examples of Austria, Denmark and Switzerland which
show even smaller volatilities than the large countries. Since these countries pursued
stability oriented economic policies which were reflected in the stability of their
currencies and inflation rates, it is more likely that economic policy plays an important
role in cyclical volatility. Second, there has been a clear trend toward a reduction in
volatility in all countries. For the EMU members and the control group countries, this
decline is most evident if one looks at the whole period of twenty years examined from
1983-87 to 1998-2002. The decline in volatility is also evident for most of the CEECs
over the last ten years. Hungary and Slovenia show the smallest volatility of cycles
among CEECs, with amplitudes lower then in many current euro zone members. Poland
and the Czech Republic also exhibit relatively low volatility.
The long-term decline in output volatility has been demonstrated for the US by
Blanchard and Simon (2001). According to their findings, this decline can be traced to a
decrease in the volatility of consumption and investment. Factors mentioned by the
authors which may have contributed to this development are improvements in financial
markets allowing better risk sharing and improvement in the conduct of monetary policy
which led to a reduction in inflation volatility. These factors have probably also played
a role in the decline of the European countries’ relative volatility vis-à-vis the euro area
cycle. It is interesting to note that in the leading CEECs, the volatility is about the same
as in the EMU countries in the period 1998-2002. This would indicate that the role of
country specific shocks has greatly diminished in these countries (see below).
4.1.4. Persistence of the business cycles
Figure 5 shows the evolution over time of the first order autocorrelation coefficient,
arranged the same way as Figure 2. From the 1993-97 to the 1998-2002 period,
persistence in the cycles of CEECs tended to increase, which is indication of
diminishing role of country specific shocks. There is only one country, Slovenia, whose
value is substantially smaller than that of other CEECs, which is surprising based on our
previous results on correlation, leads/lags, and volatility.
In the case of EMU members, the figure clearly illustrates a movement toward
similar persistence, as in the 1980s and early 1990s the autocorrelation coefficients were
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rather scattered, but have become higher and dense by the final period. This again
illustrates the increased synchronization in the EMU. Ireland, whose quarterly data is
available only for the final period, is the exception, but this is not surprising given the
highly noisy cyclical measure shown in Figure 1/b.
4.1.5. Impulse-response
Figure 6 shows the relative impact of a euro area shock on the individual countries,
based on estimations for the 1993-2002 period. A value of one indicates a full
transmittal of euro area shock to the cycle of the country, while a larger (smaller) value
indicates greater (lesser) sensitivity; a value of zero means no transmittal at all. Among
CEECs, Slovenia and Poland are the most sensitive to euro area shocks followed by
Hungary, but even these three leading CEECs show lesser sensitivity to euro area
shocks than most current EMU members. Taking into account the high
contemporaneous correlation and the similarity in volatility of the above three CEECs
with the cycle of the euro area, this result is likely due to the lower persistence of their
cycles which is probably a reflection of differences in economic structures. The other
five CEECs show zero sensitivity or even a counter cyclical pattern, which would
indicate that their economic structures are even more divergent. Among EMU countries,
Ireland stands out as the most sensitive country, since a shock has twice as big an effect
than the effect of a shock on most of the other EMU countries. This result is likely the
consequence of the extraordinary high growth rate of the Irish economy in the period
considered, which could have led to higher cyclical volatility and sensitivity to foreign
shocks.
4.1.6. Methodological differences
In the above paragraphs, we highlighted the main findings, without discussing the
differences resulting from the use of the two filtering techniques and the two different
measures of euro area economic activity. The most important observation one can make
is that the differences are not large enough to change the results or give reason to
modify the interpretations. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning them. As for the two
filtering techniques, HP tends to reveal stronger synchronization and higher persistence
than BP for the EMU members and the control group. This is not surprising based on
the results of Cogley and Nason (1995) who, as mentioned earlier, showed that the HP
filter tends to amplify the business cycle frequencies. For the CEEC countries, on the
other hand, the two filters give similar results, which is probably due to the shorter time
period examined for these countries.
Comparing the results based on the euro area aggregate and the common factor,
it is interesting to note that correlation coefficients tend to be less dispersed in the case
of the common factor. Table 3 shows the dispersion of correlation coefficients in three
country groups: (1) the 5 EMU-members that were used to calculate the common factor;
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(2) four other EMU-members20; and (3) four non-EMU European countries. For the
second and third groups of countries, the difference is smaller when using the common
factor than when using the euro zone aggregate, irrespective of which filtering
technique is used. This indicates that the group of countries which includes the three
largest EMU countries (Germany, France, Italy) captures well the euro area “common
cycle”.
4.1.7. Summing up
Before proceeding further with the examination of the cyclical behavior of GDP
components, let us sum up the main findings of the cyclical comovements of GDP.
1. Among the CEECs, all measures of comovements for Hungary, Poland and
Slovenia point toward increased and significant synchronization with the euro zone
business cycle. As mentioned earlier, Frankel and Rose (1998) document a positive
relationship between trade integration and synchronization. Figure 7 shows the share of
the EMU in the export of the CEECs. For the above mentioned three CEECs, that share
is among the highest. Imbs (2003) estimates by a system of simultaneous equations the
relative contributions of trade, finance and specialization to international comovements.
The author finds that the overall effect of trade is strong, but that it works mostly
through intraindustry rather than interindustry trade. Fontagné and Freudenberg (1999)
make a distinction between horizontal (two-way trade in varieties) and vertical (two-
way trade in qualities) intraindustry trade and argue that it is the former which leads to
greater synchronization.
Intraindustry trade between the EU and the CEECs has been studied by Fidrmuc
(2001a and 2004). Fidrmuc finds that the Grubel-Lloyd (GL) index of intraindustry
trade in Hungary, Poland and Slovenia is high, as high as in some EMU members, and
that it is very low in the Baltic countries which exhibit little or no comovement in our
calculations. Smaller intraindustry trade could be, therefore, one of the reasons for the
lack of synchronization in the Baltic countries. In his 2004 paper, he regresses the
correlation of business cycles among some OECD countries (not including CEECs) and
finds that the GL index is an important explanatory variable. In spite of the success in
explaining correlations of OECD countries, the GL index has weaknesses in measuring
intraindustry trade. First, the sub-sectors adopted should be reasonably large to include
all possible vertical links, which is difficult to determine. Second, the GL measure
introduces a bias for small countries with high current account deficits, which are the
characteristics of some CEECs, especially the Baltics. Frankel (2004) doubts the
usefulness of distinguishing between intraindustry and interindustry trade from the
perspective of synchronization. He notes that trade in inputs and intermediate products,
constituting as it does a large share of today’s trade, gives rise to positive correlations
and yet it may be recorded as interindustry trade.
                                                
20 Ireland is excluded since its data is available only since 1997.
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2. There is clear evidence of increased synchronization within the euro zone,
particularly since the start of the run-up to EMU. This would, prima facie, strengthen
the argument of the endogeneity of OCA properties as argued by Frankel and Rose
(1998). To an extent this is no doubt the case, but other factors must also be at work,
since several of the control group countries, including the U.S. and Japan and, to a
lesser extent, also Russia, have also become more synchronized with the EMU. These
results lend support to the empirical evidence for a world business cycle reported by
several studies, such as, for example, Gerlach (1988), Lumsdaine and Prasad (1997) and
Kose et al. (2003).
4.2. Industry and Trade
4.2.1. Industrial Production
We continue the analysis with the second most frequently analyzed series of the
synchronization literature: industrial production. Figure 8 shows the evolution of the
correlations of industrial production cycles of individual countries vis-à-vis the euro
area aggregate cycle. Hungary had a high level of correlation already in the 1993-97
period, but the other two leading CEECs, Poland and Slovenia, made good progress
toward synchronization. Previous studies (for instance, Fidrmuc 2001b, Korhonen 2003
and Fidrmuc 2004) also tended to conclude that Hungary and Slovenia are well
integrated, but among recent papers, only Boreiko (2002) found high correlation for
Poland. It is interesting to note that the Czech Republic and Estonia also made some
progress in synchronization, in contrast to the results observed for GDP. Among EMU
countries, the synchronization in Portugal increased substantially since 1993-97 to join
the already high level of synchronization of the other euro zone countries. In the control
group, the UK and the Swiss cycles became more synchronized with a level as high or
higher than several EMU members. These results confirm the findings of Kaufmann
(2003), who showed with a Bayesian cluster analysis of industrial production growth
rates that EMU members belong to the same cluster and that the UK and Switzerland
follow more closely the European rather than the overseas cycles.
Figure 9 shows the level of correlations between the cycles of the euro area
aggregate and individual countries in the most recent five-year period of 1998Q1-
2002Q4. Again, the three leading CEECs stand out as having the highest level of
correlation, comparable to that of the EMU members.
The evolution of the leads/lags of the cycles shows increased contemporaneous
comovement both for the three leading CEECs and all EMU members. Our persistence
measure indicates similar or even larger values than most EMU members for the three
leading CEECs and the Czech Republic, which could indicate that the role of country
specific shocks were even less then in the EMU countries.
The high level of synchronization of industrial production in the EMU members
and also in several CEECs is not surprising, since industry generates a large proportion
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of foreign trade, which is one of the main channels through which synchronization can
occur. In order to examine this question empirically, we continue with the analysis of
exports and imports.
4.2.2. Trade
Figure 10 shows the correlation coefficients of export cycles. The evolution of the
correlation coefficients and the leads/lags indicate a strong improvement in
synchronization in all country groups, which is an indication of the globalized world of
trade. The level of correlation is also very high in almost all countries and even exceeds
the values observed for industrial production. Among the CEECs, in addition to the
three leading countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia also indicate high levels of
correlation, in contrast to the case of GDP and industrial production. The only two
countries standing out of the general trend are Norway and especially Russia, which
could be explained by the specific commodity structure (oil) of their exports. Import
cycles exhibit very similar trends, although the levels of correlation are somewhat
lower, with the exception of Hungary (Figure 11). The lower level of import
comovement across countries could be explained by the fact that imports are more
sensitive to country specific shocks, such as government spending and changes in
consumption behavior (see below).
4.3. Consumption, services and investment
We now turn to the analysis of the more domestically oriented expenditure components
of GDP and start with private consumption. We only look at private consumption, since
government consumption can be regarded as a policy-driven component, the
synchronization of which, if any, is driven by policy actions. While in the EMU
adherence to the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact may be a factor
pushing toward greater fiscal policy synchronization, this is not the case in the CEECs
for the time being.
There is a branch of business cycle literature that looks at the correlation across
countries of consumption in comparison to output. The prediction of various one-good,
complete-markets models is that consumption should be correlated across countries
even if output does not correlate. The reason is that international risk sharing allows the
separation of consumption from country specific income shocks. This result shows up
both in simple two period optimizing models even when the coefficients of risk aversion
and the subjective discount factors differ across countries (see, for example Chapter 5 of
Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996), and in calibrated international real business cycle models
(see, for example, Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1992). However, empirical studies have
found that consumption is generally less synchronized across countries then GDP,
which is regarded as one of the six major puzzles in international macroeconomics by
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) and is referred to as the “consumption-correlation puzzle”.
For instance, in a comprehensive paper Ambler et al (2004) extend the country coverage
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of previous papers by studying twenty industrial countries and consider all pairwise
cross-country correlations, for the sample of 1960Q1-2000Q4, which is also broken into
two subperiods at 1973. They conclude that the low cross-country correlation of
consumption is the most important discrepancy with theory.21 Factors most of the time
mentioned in the literature contributing to this “puzzle” are non-traded goods,
imperfection of financial market integration that hinders risk pooling and consumption
smoothing, the presence of durable goods in consumption, imperfect competition, and
trade costs.
Our data confirm that consumption is generally less synchronized than GDP.
What is interesting from our perspective is that the comovement of private consumption
has increased in all the euro zone countries since 1993-97 and in several of the control
group countries as well, except in Denmark, Japan and Russia (Figure 12). Moreover, in
most of the countries the increase in consumption correlation is larger than the increase
in output correlation, as it is shown by Figure 13. The persistence of consumption cycles
has also became more similar in the EMU (except Ireland) and in most of the control
countries as well (Figure 14). This would indicate that the influence of the above
mentioned factors that are behind the smaller comovement of private consumption
across countries has been greatly diminished within the euro zone and, interestingly,
also between the euro zone and the US. More globalized financial markets with fewer
information barriers, less trade frictions and fewer asymmetric shocks are likely to be
behind this development. Regarding international risk sharing, Figures 15/a and 15/b
show that the stock of foreign assets and liabilities (FDI and portfolio investments in
bonds and shares) rose indeed very sharply in the industrial world in the last ten years, a
phenomenon observed in both EMU and non-EMU countries.22 This suggests the
international consumption-correlation puzzle could further lessen in the future.
The picture is very different when we look at the CEECs. Only Poland, and to a
lesser extent Lithuania, show some increase toward greater comovement, while the
other countries have a negative correlation with the EMU aggregate, and the movement
has been toward greater asynchronicity.23 The volatility of cycle relative to the euro area
is also generally larger than in the case of output (compare Tables 2 and 4). We can only
speculate about the reasons of this development. Trade and capital flows have been
liberalized during the period under review which would argue in favor of greater, not
smaller comovement. However, capital movement liberalization has been more gradual
than trade liberalization in a number of CEECs. Furthermore, information barriers and
stronger home bias in the financial markets due to the fact that capital markets had been
                                                
21 For further models and empirical research on this topic see also Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Devereux,
Gregory, and Smith (1992), Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1993), Baxter (1995), Bayoumi and
MacDonald (1995), Stockman and Tesar (1995), Lewis (1996), Christodoulakis, Dimelis and Kollintzas
(1995) and Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2003).
22 Hence, our results confirm the findings of Ahmadi (2004), who examines the decline in equity home
bias over recent years. He attributes some of the decline to mutual fund investment and the internet.
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restricted for many decades before the reforms have certainly contributed to weak risk
pooling and less consumption smoothing. As Figure 15/c shows, the stock of assets
invested abroad by the CEECs is negligible in sharp contrast with the development
observed in the other countries examined.
Moreover, part of the causes for the lack of comovement in consumption can
probably be traced back to the asymmetric shocks these countries were exposed to and
the way in which private consumption reacted to them. As known, all CEECs
experienced a sharp contraction in incomes in the early part of the 1990s as a result of
the collapse of trade with the former Soviet Union and the market oriented reforms
(price and trade liberalization, reduction in subsidies, increase in inflation). This led to
sharp reductions in consumption. When things turned for the better after the mind-1990s
as the reforms gained hold and the new investments matured into production, the pent-
up consumption demand, fueled sometimes by loose fiscal policy and high wage
increases, led to a strong growth in consumption. These developments, which did not
occur at the same time in all CEECs,  surely contributed to the observed lack of
comovement in private consumption vis-à-vis the EMU cycle. The move toward
synchronization in Poland could be explained by the fact that GDP growth recovered
faster in Poland then in the other CEECs which led to an earlier return to more normal
patterns of private consumption. That the CEECs were subject to grater shocks is also
reflected in the much higher volatility and larger leads/lags of private consumption
compared to the euro area and the control group countries.
The above considerations make us believe that the lack of comovement in
private consumption is a temporary phenomenon which will turn around as agents
become better informed about and more familiarized with the possibilities of risk
pooling and, more importantly, as the effects of reform-induced shocks will fade away
and consumption patterns will assume a smoother long-term pattern. It will be
interesting to redo our calculations a few years from now to test this assumption.
Since services account for a large part of consumption, not surprisingly they
exhibit similar trends as private consumption: increase in synchronization in the euro
zone and the control group countries and decrease in the CEECs, except in Poland and
Slovakia. Volatilities and leads/lags are also larger and persistence is lower in the
CEECs then in the euro area and the control group countries.
The cyclical correlation of investment is not very different from that observed
for consumption (Figure 16). In the euro zone, one can observe a trend toward greater
comovement since 1993-97, although the level of synchronization is generally lower
than for GDP or its other expenditure components. It is interesting to point out the
increased comovement of the US and Japan with the EMU cycle. This again lends
support to the argument that the business cycle of major countries is becoming more
globalized and that there is a world business cycle. As for the CEECs, only Poland and
                                                                                                                                              
23 This phenomenon also characterises Russia, as its GDP cycles are positively correlated, while
consumption cycles correlate negatively.
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Hungary show some moves toward greater synchronization. Not surprisingly, the
volatility of investment in the CEECs is higher then in the other countries, as
investments have been very much influenced by the pace of the reforms, in particular
privatization and the associated FDI inflows.
5. Conclusion
This paper examines the business cycle synchronization in the new EU members of
Central and Eastern Europe and the euro zone countries, together with a control group
countries. We analyze GDP and its major expenditure and sectoral components. From
the perspective of common monetary policy, it is relevant to know to what extent are
synchronized those components of GDP which drive aggregate demand and therefor
influence inflation. To make our findings more robust, we use five measures of
synchronization, two filtering techniques and two measures of euro area economic
activity against which we measure the comovements of individual countries’ business
cycles. One of our goals was to assess the current degree of synchronization of the
CEECs and to see to what extent they are satisfying one of the OCA criteria, namely,
the synchronization of their business cycles with the euro area. Our second goal was to
see whether synchronization in the euro zone countries has increased in the run-up
period to the EMU and since the start of the monetary union in order to test for OCA
endogeneity. If there is evidence of such endogeneity, than CEECs can expect that once
they are members of the EMU, their business cycles will start moving toward greater
synchronization and they will need to be less concerned with initial idiosyncrasies. The
empirical evidence suggests a number of conclusions of which we would like to
emphasize the following.
In Tables 5-8 we have grouped the countries according to their degree of
synchronization. We reverse the order followed so far and start with the EMU countries,
which we can split into two groups: the “core” countries (Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) which show higher synchronization, and the
“peripheric” countries (Finland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) which exhibit lower
comovement. We also grouped together the three EMU-outs (Denmark, Sweden, the
UK) and Switzerland, and show separately the US, Japan, and Russia.
It is remarkable that the core EMU countries show a high degree of
synchronization according to all the measures we use (high correlation, low volatility,
small leads/lags, similar and high persistence, similar impulse-response) and this not
only for GDP, but for its components as well. The synchronization has significantly
increased between 1993-97 and 1998-2002, a period consisting of the run-up to EMU,
followed by membership in the monetary union. For the peripheric EMU countries, the
same overall trends can be observed, but their level of synchronization is less advanced,
particularly for consumption and services. It is noteworthy that five out of the six core
countries are the original funding members of the EU and the sixth, Austria, has had a
fix exchange rate to the Deutsche mark since the mid-1970s. The peripheric countries
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had lower income per capita and were on a catch-up growth path toward the average of
EU level, which could be a reason for the slower convergence in business cycles, since
the catch-up period could be accompanied by more intensive country specific shocks
and uncertainties. Another reason could be that these countries joined the EU much
later, hence they integrated into the EU trade later. Mitchell and Mouratidis (2003) also
document an increase in the business cycle correlation in the euro zone, but they only
analyze industrial production. Our study supports more broadly this trend and is thus
more convincing.
Are the above trends evidence of the endogeneity of OCA? At first glance one
could argue that yes, because synchronization has increased in all EMU members since
the start of the run-up to EMU, when countries begun a process of meeting the
Maastricht criteria of nominal convergence to be ready to adopt the euro in 1999. The
reason why one can not be unambiguous about this interpretation is that the non-EMU
European countries and even the US and to some extent Japan and Russia have also
shown greater comovement with the euro cycle. This points toward the emergence of a
“world business cycle” noted also by several authors.
Nevertheless, there are also some good news for the advocates of OCA
endogeneity. First, the extent of synchronization is very high within the EMU core
countries and the peripheric EMU countries have been moving toward that level.
Second, synchronization has become high even for the traditionally less synchronized
components of GDP, namely private consumption and services. Consumption, however,
remains less synchronized than GDP. Our findings thus confirm the consumption-
correlation puzzle, but they also show that this phenomenon is becoming significantly
less important. Greater financial integration, more competition, reduced trade costs,
including the elimination of separate currencies, and converging policies on the way to
and within EMU have surely played a role in the greater business cycle synchronization.
However, business cycle correlation is an evolutionary process and as Rogoff’s (2001)
Nail Soup story reminds us, we can not attribute all of the causes to one single
ingredient, the euro. That said, it can be argued that the strong business cycle
correlations observed in the EMU countries make the common monetary policy more
suited and less of a problem for the current participants of the monetary union.
Turning to the CEECs, we can split them into three distinct groups: Hungary,
Poland and Slovenia (labeled as CEE1 in the Tables 5-8), which are the most
synchronized; the Czech Republic and Slovakia (CEE2), which are less synchronized;
and the Baltic States (CEE3), which are not synchronized at all.
It is quite remarkable that in the three leading countries in the first group,
synchronization for GDP, industrial production and exports has improved dramatically
to reach by 1998-2002 levels that are similar to that in the core EMU countries and even
higher than in the EMU peripheric countries. Within a short period of time, these three
CEECs were able to completely restructure their production and orient their exports
away from the Eastern Block and toward the EU, leading to strong correlation with the
euro area business cycle. Privatization and FDI inflows have played a crucial role in that
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process. The lesser synchronization of the Czech Republic and Slovakia is most likely
due to the insufficient reforms and macroeconomic imbalances in the first half of the
1990s, leading to currency crises in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1997 and 1998,
respectively, followed by a recession. Since the reforms have been accelerated and
growth has resumed, these two countries will most probably reach as high a level of
synchronization as the leading CEECs in the coming years.
The lack of synchronization in the Baltic countries is probably a reflection of the
shocks that they experienced in the wake of the Russian crisis of 1998. The economic
and trade links of the Baltic countries with Russia at the time were much more extensive
than was the case for the other CEECs. This is reflected in the significant positive
correlation with the Russian business cycle in 1993-97, which however declined to
close to zero or even to negative value by 1998-2002. Another factor already discussed
in the paper could be the smaller share of intraindustry trade between the EU and the
Baltic States. Finally, the Baltic countries’ trade links with the Nordic countries are
important and, as we have seen, the synchronization of the Nordic countries with the
euro zone is not as strong.
In all the CEECs there is minimal or even negative correlation with the EMU
cycle of private consumption and hence also of services. Consumption represents an
important share in aggregate demand and the question can be asked whether it is wise
for a country to give up monetary policy independence if there is no correlation in
consumption, even though there is high correlation for GDP, driven by industrial
production and export correlation. This question has to be looked at from several
perspectives. First, we have argued in the paper that the lack of consumption correlation
is due to sudden shifts in consumption behavior and weak risk pooling, owing to greater
information barrier and home bias in the financial assets markets. We believe that the
influences of these factors are diminishing and that the lack of private consumption
correlation is a temporary phenomenon.
Second, there is the question of sufficiency. As pointed out by Artis (2003),
there is nothing in the relevant theory to establish what is a needed degree of
synchronization to participate in a currency union. It may be enough to be assured that
the new entrant is not substantially more idiosyncratic then those already in. The Five
Tests study by HM Treasury (2003) looking at the United States as a monetary union
concludes that a currency union can prosper with quite varied regional business cycles.
This is because financial market integration, price and wage flexibility and labor market
mobility can help adjust to idiosyncratic shocks. However, if wages are sticky and labor
mobility is restricted by language and cultural barriers, the argument can be made that if
cycles of major components of aggregate demand are very divergent, giving up
monetary policy independence might not be the optimal solution. A counter argument is
that, as discussed, participation in a currency union may itself lead to greater
synchronization of business cycles. Furthermore, for small open economies like the
CEECs, the room to follow independent monetary policy is rather limited and the
arguments of Buiter (2000) and Artis and Ehrmann (2000) that exchange rate flexibility
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can be as much a source of shocks as a shock absorber is to be reckoned with. Finally,
one has to look at the counterfactual as well and ask the question whether the arguments
in favor of retaining monetary independence are strong enough to negate the benefits of
participating in the monetary union.
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7. Data Appendix
Our main data source is the OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts database (January
2004 edition). Hence, data for sectoral components (i.e. industrial production and
services) used in our paper are value added based. The table below lists the starting year
of available data. Data from sources other than the OECD’s database are underlined.
Starting year of available data
Country name Country
code
GDP Private
consump
tion
Investm
ent
Exports Imports Indust.
prod.
Services
CEECs
Czech Republic CZE 1993 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994 1994
Estonia EST 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1994 n.a.
Hungary HUN 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1995 1995
Latvia LAT 1993 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 n.a.
Lithuania LIT 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 n.a. n.a.
Poland POL 1993 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995
Slovak Republic SKK 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993 1994 1994
Slovenia SLO 1993 1999 1999 1999 1999 1993 1993
EMU
EMU-aggregate EMU      1991 1991
Austria AUT  1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988
Belgium BEL       
France FRA       
Finland FIN       
Germany GER  1991 1991 1991 1991 1991 1991
Ireland IRE 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997  n.a.
Italy ITA       
Netherlands NDL      1987 1987
Portugal POR  1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995
Spain SPA       
Control group
Denmark DEN 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988 1988
Sweden SWE       
United Kingdom UK       
Switzerland SWI       n.a.
Norway NOR       
United States USA       
Japan JAP       n.a.
Russia RUS 1993 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 1995
Notes.  : the series is available since 1980; n.a.: not available. Series underlined are taken (at
least partly) from other sources than the OECD’s Quarterly National Accounts database.
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Other sources:
Czech Republic: quarterly national accounts are available from the OECD database
since 1994Q1. For 1993, GDP data was calculated with the method of Várpalotai
(2003).
EMU-aggregate: 4th update (2003) of the ECB Area-Wide Model database for GDP and
its expenditure components; see Fagan et al (2001). Value added of services and
industrial production is from the ECB.
Estonia: The IMF - International Financial Statistics (IFS) database contains real GDP
and nominal expenditure components. Consumption was deflated with CPI;
investments, exports and imports were deflated with PPI. For industrial output only
gross industrial output is available (source: Eesti Pank).
Greece: The only Greek data available at a quarterly frequency is gross industrial
production, which is from the IFS.
Hungary: quarterly national accounts are available from the Hungarian Central
Statistical Office since 1995Q1. For 1993-94, data were calculated by Várpalotai
(2003).
Ireland: Gross industrial production is from the IFS.
Japan: Gross industrial production is from the IFS.
Latvia: The source of GDP and its expenditure components for 1995Q1-2003Q3 is the
Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (CSBL). GDP for 1993-1994 is taken from the IFS,
which was chained back to CSBL data starting in 1995. For industrial output only gross
industrial output is available (source: CSBL).
Lithuania: The IFS database contains real GDP and nominal expenditure components.
Consumption was deflated with CPI; investments, exports and imports were deflated
with PPI. The January 2004 issue of the IFS likely included measurement errors for real
GDP as it indicated an annual real growth rate of around 40 percent in 1994. Therefore,
we chained the data for 1993-94 as it was included in the November 2003 edition with
data for 1995-2003 included in the January 2004 edition.
Poland: quarterly national accounts are available from 1995Q1 to 2002Q2 in the OECD
dataset. Data for 2002Q3-Q4 (and some quarters in 2003) are from the dX Econdata of
Emerging Market Economic Data Ltd. Quarterly GDP data for 1993-94 were calculated
with the method of Várpalotai (2003).
Portugal: quarterly national accounts are available in the OECD database since 1995.
Pre-1995 GDP data are from the IFS.
Russia: dX Econdata of Emerging Market Economic Data Ltd (January 2004 edition)
for 1995-2003. GDP data for 1993-94 were calculated with the method of Várpalotai
(2003).
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Slovak Republic: dX Econdata of Emerging Market Economic Data Ltd (January 2004
edition).
Slovenia: Bank of Slovenia.
Switzerland: Gross industrial production is from the IFS.
United States: Services - US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Gross industrial production is from the IFS.
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8. Tables
Table 1/a: GDP - Leads or Lags of the Largest Correlation with the
EMU Aggregate, 1983-2002
based on HP-filter based on BP-filter
1983-
87
1988-
92
1993-
97
1998-
2002
1983-
87
1988-
92
1993-
97
1998-
2002
CEECs
CZE -1 -3 -2 -3
EST -3 -1 -3 -1
HUN 2 0 3 0
LAT 3 -3 3 -1
LIT -3 -3 -3 -3
POL 0 1 0 1
SKK 0 3 -1 -3
SLO 2 1 2 2
EMU member states
AUT 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 1
BEL 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
FIN 3 3 2 0 3 3 2 0
FRA 0 3 0 0 0 3 0 0
GER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IRE 0 1
ITA 0 3 0 -1 0 0 0 -1
NDL 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
POR -1 0 0 0 0 -3
SPA 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0
Control group
DEN 2 1 0 2 1 0
SWE 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 1
SWI -2 1 0 0 -1 1 1 0
UK_ 2 3 2 0 2 3 2 -1
NOR -2 0 2 0 -2 -1 1 0
JAP -1 1 -2 -1 0 1 -3 -1
USA -1 3 2 2 -1 3 3 2
RUS -3 -1 -3 0
Notes. 0: contemporaneous correlation is the largest; negative value: the EMU leads the
country studied; positive value: the EMU lags the country studied. The maximum
leads/lags studied is 3 quarters.
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Table 1/b: GDP - Leads or Lags of the Largest Correlation with the
EMU-5 Common Factor, 1983-2002
based on HP-filter based on BP-filter
1983-
87
1988-
92
1993-
97
1998-
2002
1983-
87
1988-
92
1993-
97
1998-
2002
CEECs
CZE -2 -3 -2 -3
EST 3 -1 -3 -1
HUN 1 -1 1 -1
LAT 2 -2 2 -1
LIT 3 3 -3 3
POL -3 0 -1 0
SKK 0 3 0 3
SLO 2 0 2 0
EMU member states
AUT 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0
BEL -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FIN 3 3 0 0 3 3 0 -1
FRA 0 0 -1 -1 0 3 0 -1
GER 0 -1 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1
IRE 0 0
ITA 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -2
NDL -1 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0
POR -1 0 0 0 0 -3
SPA 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Control group
DEN 0 0 0 -2 0 0
SWE 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 -1
SWI -2 0 0 -1 -2 3 1 -1
UK_ 0 3 0 -1 2 3 2 -2
NOR -2 0 1 0 -2 -1 1 -1
JAP -1 0 -3 -2 0 1 -3 -2
USA -2 3 0 0 -1 3 3 0
RUS -3 -1 -3 0
Notes. 0: contemporaneous correlation is the largest; negative value: the EMU leads the
country studied; positive value: the EMU lags the country studied. The maximum
leads/lags studied is 3 quarters.
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Table 2: GDP - Volatility of the Cycle Relative to the Euro Area, 1983-
2002
based on HP-filter based on BP-filter
1983-
87
1988-
92
1993-
97
1998-
02
1983-
87
1988-
92
1993-
97
1998-
02
CEECs (EMU = 100)
CZE 251 189 297 275
EST 367 261 413 399
HUN 216 90 253 122
LAT 305 180 356 263
LIT 636 354 699 615
POL 160 165 170 181
SKK 100 146 79 168
SLO 90 118 109 157
EMU member states (EMU = 100)
AUT 140 101 95 111 147 114 91 131
BEL 127 104 128 151 123 109 138 181
FIN 178 340 277 182 242 416 220 159
FRA 122 105 114 114 88 90 122 102
GER 149 154 90 105 174 229 111 132
IRE 266 339
ITA 101 94 134 91 90 105 146 126
NDL 169 108 108 153 206 174 71 130
POR 166 149 168 248 106 137
SPA 163 143 139 101 104 128 106 60
Control group (EMU = 100)
DEN 131 168 73 162 168 103
SWE 128 197 242 155 160 168 253 168
SWI 148 187 93 109 196 177 62 114
UK_ 101 251 109 69 136 191 129 105
NOR 217 155 201 133 190 232 165 188
JAP 144 180 184 139 149 163 210 202
USA 169 152 75 145 204 130 112 162
RUS 414 457 420 464
Volatility of the euro area (in percent)
0.69 1.09 0.83 0.80 0.71 0.63 0.73 0.59
Notes. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation around the mean zero.
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Table 3: GDP - Dispersion of Correlation Coefficients, 1983-2002
filter EMU-
measure
1983-87 1988-92 1993-97 1998-02
Group 1
HP AG 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.03
HP CF 0.19 0.10 0.11 0.08
BP AG 0.09 0.26 0.18 0.07
BP CF 0.11 0.26 0.11 0.15
Group 2
HP AG 0.26 0.28 0.18 0.14
HP CF 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.12
BP AG 0.22 0.31 0.12 0.18
BP CF 0.18 0.28 0.11 0.14
Group 3
HP AG 0.22 0.35 0.19 0.12
HP CF 0.09 0.25 0.10 0.07
BP AG 0.24 0.31 0.20 0.14
BP CF 0.19 0.33 0.12 0.21
Notes: The table shows mean absolute deviation from group-specific mean. Group 1:
Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands; Group 2: Belgium, Finland, Portugal,
Spain; Group 3: Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, UK; AG: based on aggregate data for
the euro area; CF: based on the common factor of the 5 countries included in group 1.
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Table 4: Private Consumption - Volatility of the Cycle Relative to the
Euro Area, 1983-2002
based on HP-filter based on BP-filter
1983-
87
1988-
92
1993-
97
1998-
02
1983-
87
1988-
92
1993-
97
1998-
02
CEECs (EMU = 100)
CZE 384 172 501 246
EST 393 398 554 602
HUN 350 143 392 206
LAT 435 221 627 277
LIT 1202 241 1826 353
POL 221 135 264 163
SKK 280 277 385 387
SLO 174 274
EMU member states (EMU = 100)
AUT 84 102 88 106 145 116
BEL 106 94 93 112 161 100 103 132
FIN 155 317 330 136 393 311 333 117
FRA 120 85 121 82 154 60 159 69
GER 87 146 126 191
IRE 508 737
ITA 121 153 179 117 147 193 165 128
NDL 120 121 137 154 220 221 111 117
POR 141 171 197 184
SPA 183 165 159 104 120 117 125 77
Control group (EMU = 100)
DEN 111 177 167 105 223 198
SWE 266 194 185 173 301 180 196 196
SWI 55 88 79 67 64 73 87 58
UK_ 162 310 81 77 268 266 156 105
NOR 400 145 136 95 615 244 138 149
JAP 82 125 128 68 143 148 192 79
USA 93 134 65 99 172 117 152 118
RUS 391 482 578 550
Volatility of the euro area (in percent)
0.69 1.09 0.83 0.80 0.71 0.63 0.73 0.59
Notes. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation around the mean zero.
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9. Figures
Figure 1/a: GDP Cycles of CEECs and Russia, 1980-2002
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Figure 1/b: GDP Cycles of EMU Members, 1980-2002
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Figure 1/c: GDP Cycles of Control Group Countries, 1980-2002
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Figure 2/a: GDP - Correlation with the Cycle of EMU Aggregate, 1983-2002
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Figure 2/b: GDP - Correlation with the Cycle of EMU-5 Common Factor, 1983-
2002
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
CZE
EST
HUN
LAT
LIT
POL
SKK
SLO
1983-87 1988-92 1993-97 1998-02
Based on HP-filter
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
CZE
EST
HUN
LAT
LIT
POL
SKK
SLO
1983-87 1988-92 1993-97 1998-02
Based on BP-filter
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
AUT
BEL
FIN
FRA
GER
IRE
ITA
NDL
POR
SPA
1983-87 1988-92 1993-97 1998-02
Based on HP-filter
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
AUT
BEL
FIN
FRA
GER
IRE
ITA
NDL
POR
SPA
1983-87 1988-92 1993-97 1998-02
Based on BP-filter
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
DEN
SWE
SWI
UK_
NOR
JAP
USA
RUS
1983-87 1988-92 1993-97 1998-02
Based on HP-filter
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
DEN
SWE
SWI
UK_
NOR
JAP
USA
RUS
1983-87 1988-92 1993-97 1998-02
Based on BP-filter
51
Figure 3: GDP – Correlation of CEECs with the Cycles of Russia and the EMU,
1993-2002
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Figure 4: GDP – Level of Correlation with the EMU Cycle, 1998-2002
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Figure 5: GDP - Persistence, 1983-2002
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Figure 6: GDP - Relative Impact of the EMU-5 Common Factor*, 1993-2002
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Figure 7: The Share of EMU in Exports, 1993-2001
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Figure 8: Industrial Production - Correlation With the Cycle of the EMU
Aggregate, 1983-2002
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Figure 9: Industrial Production – Level of Correlation With the Cycle of EMU
Aggregate, 1998-2002
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Figure 10: Exports - Correlation With the Cycle of the EMU Aggregate, 1983-
2002
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Figure 11: Imports - Correlation With the Cycle of the EMU Aggregate, 1983-
2002
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Figure 12: Private Consumption - Correlation With the Cycle of the EMU
Aggregate, 1983-2002
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Figure 13: The Consumption-Correlation Puzzle: Correlation of Consumption
Less Correlation of GDP
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Figure 14: Private Consumption - Persistence, 1983-2002
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Figure 15/a: EMU members: International Investment Position, 1980-2002
(percent of GDP)
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Note: all panels are equally scaled to [0,100] except that of Finland and Ireland. Liabilities are the
stock of foreign investment in the domestic economy; assets are the stock of domestic investment
abroad. FDI: foreign direct investment, PI: portfolio investment. Source: authors' calculation based
on data in the IMF-International Financial Statistics.
64
Figure 15/b: Control group: International Investment Position, 1980-2002
(percent of GDP)
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Notes: all panels are equally scaled to [0,70] except that of Switzerland. For wider international
comparison, the Figure also includes data for Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), Mexico (MEX), and
South Africa (SAF). Liabilities are the stock of foreign investment in the domestic economy; assets
are the stock of domestic investment abroad. FDI: foreign direct investment, PI: portfolio
investment. Source: authors' calculation based on data in the IMF-International Financial Statistics.
65
Figure 15/c: CEECs: International Investment Position, 1980-2002 (percent of
GDP)
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Notes: all panels are equally scaled to [0,60]. For wider international comparison, the Figure also
includes data for Bulgaria (BUL), Romania (ROM), and Croatia (CRO). Liabilities are the stock of
foreign investment in the domestic economy; assets are the stock of domestic investment abroad.
FDI: foreign direct investment, PI: portfolio investment. Source: authors' calculation based on data
in the IMF-International Financial Statistics.
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Figure 16: Investment - Correlation With the Cycle of the EMU Aggregate,
1983-2002
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